Een Wikileaks document dat op 19 mei 1973 verzonden is vanuit Frankrijk geeft weer hoe de toenmalige Franse president Pompidou dacht over de SDR, het instrument van het IMF dat volgens sommigen de rol van goud op de balans van de centrale bank zou kunnen vervangen. Pompidou is sceptisch en dat liet hij in 1973 al weten. Hij zag SDR’s niet als een volwaardige alternatief voor goud en benadrukte dat de reserve er één moest zijn die geen enkel land kon ‘bijdrukken’.
1. AS PROMISED REFTEL, FOLLOWING IS FURTHER DISCUSSION OF AGENDA ITEM ON INTERNATIONAL MONETARY REFORM. IT STRESSES ISSUES WHICH WILL BE UPPERMOST IN MIND OF PRESIDENT POMPIDOU, PARTICULARLY POINTS WHERE FRENCH AND U. S. APPROACHES DIFFER WIDELY.
2. CONVERTIBILITY. POMPIDOU WILL PROBABLY BEAR DOWN HARDEST ON IMPORTANCE OF AGREEING AT EARLIEST POSSIBLE MOMENT ON CONDITIONS FOR RESUMPTION OF GENERAL CURRENCY CONVERTIBILITY, AND MORE PARTICULARLY OF DOLLAR CONVERTIBILITY. ( SEE, FOR EXAMPLE, PARIS 13534.) IN FRENCH VIEW, CONVERTIBILITY ARRANGEMENTS SHOULD BE DESIGNED SO THAT SETTLEMENTS OF BALANCES BETWEEN
CENTRAL BANKS ARE MADE ONLY IN RESERVE ASSETS THAT CANNOT BE CREATED AT WILL BY A SINGLE NATION. IN CONNECTION WITH RESTORATION CONVERTIBILITY, GOF IS READY EXAMINE METHODS OF CONSOLIDATING EXISTING DOLLAR BALANCES. IN DISCUSSING THIS ISSUE, WE COULD AGAIN EMPHASIZE: A) LINK BETWEEN CONVERTIBILITY ARRANGEMENTS AND OTHER ELEMENTS OF REFORMED SYSTEM, AND B) GREAT DIFFICULTY OF RESTORING DOLLAR CONVERTIBILITY BEFORE WE REACH BALANCE OF PAYMENTS EQUILIBRIUM.
2. Converteerbaarheid. Pompidou zal het belang van een overeenkomst, waarin de condities voor algemene converteerbaarheid van valuta worden vastgelegd, waarschijnlijk het meest benadrukken. Meer bijzonder de converteerbaarheid van de Amerikaanse dollar. De Franse visie hierop is dat de converteerbaarheid zodanig vormgegeven moet worden dat het vereffenen van balansen van centrale banken alleen gedaan kan worden met een reserve die niet door één land naar wens gecreëerd kan worden.
Toelichting Marketupdate: Deze Franse visie op het internationale monetaire systeem werd jaren eerder al uitgesproken door de voorganger van Pompidou, namelijk Charles de Gaulle. Hij hield in 1965 (toen het Bretton Woods systeem met inwisselbaar goud nog actief was!) een speech waarin hij benadrukte dat alleen goud de stabiele monetaire basis kan zijn voor het wereldwijde monetaire stelsel. Hieronder een YouTube videofragment van die speech.
Charles de Gaulle, voorganger van Pompidou, verwees in 1965 naar goud als de ultieme reserve
3. GOLD AND RESERVE ASSETS. GOF HAS COME SOME DISTANCE IN ENDORSING CONCEPT THAT SDR WILL BE MAJOR INSTRUMENT FOR ASSURING FUTURE RESERVE GROWTH. THEY STILL STRONGLY BELIEVE, HOWEVER, PRACTICALLY AS AN ARTICLE OF FAITH, THAT GOLD SHOULD CONTINUE AS ONE OF THE LINCHPINS OF THE SYSTEM. POMPIDOU WILL EXPRESS GRAVE DOUBTS THAT SDRS CAN SUCCESSFULLY REPLACE GOLD AS ULTIMATE RESERVE ASSET.
OUR REBUTTAL COULD EFFECTIVELY STRESS RECENT EVENTS. VOLATILE BEHAVIOR OF FREE GOLD MARKET, WHICH IS VERY THIN AND DEPENDENT ON SOUTH AFRICAN AND RUSSIAN SUPPLY, CLEARLY ILLUSTRATES PROBLEMS IN RETAINING IMPORTANT TRADE COMMODITY AS ULTIMATE MONETARY STANDARD.
3. Goud en reserves. De Franse regering vindt het moeilijk om steun te geven aan het idee dat de SDR een belangrijk instrument zal worden om toekomstige groei van reserves te verzekeren. Ze geloven er sterk in dat goud, als onderdeel van vertrouwen, de hoeksteen moet blijven van het systeem. Pompidou zal ten zeerste betwijfelen dat SDR’s succesvol het goud kunnen vervangen als ultieme reserve asset. Onze weerlegging zou kunnen zijn dat de goudmarkt zeer volatiel is, door het dunne aanbod en de grote afhankelijkheid van aanbod uit Zuid-Afrika en Rusland. Dat illustreert duidelijk de problemen van het vasthouden aan een belangrijke grondstof voor de handel als ultieme monetaire standaard.
4. CAPITAL CONTROLS. FRENCH BUREAUCRATIC TRADITIONS HAVE CONDITIONED GOF TO IMPORTANCE USE CAPITAL CONTROLS AS DEVICE FOR DEALING WITH DISEQUILIBRATING MONEY FLOWS. AS THEY SEE IT, IN WORLD WHERE MASSIVE AMOUNTS OF MONEY CAN MOVE SUDDENLY IN RESPONSE TO SPECULATIVE PRESSURES, COUNTRIES MUST HAVE WAYS OF PREVENTING THEMSELVES FROM BEING DROWNED IN OR DRAINED OF LIQUIDITY. OUR APPROACH TO CONTROLS STRENGTHENS GOF FEELING THAT WE SEEK A STRONG
TRADE ACCOUNT IN ORDER FINANCE CONTINUED STREAM OF OUTWARD DIRECT INVESTMENT TO INDUSTRIALIZED NATIONS. IN DEALING WITH THESE POINTS, WE COULD CONCEDE THHT SOME COUNTRIES MAY HAVE TO EMPLOY CAPITAL CONTROLS TEMPORARILY ON SOME OCCASIONS. IN GENERAL, HOWEVER, WE SHOULD CONTINUE EXPRESS STRONG VIEW THAT COST OF CONTROLS IN DISTORTING ALLOCATION OF WORLD RESOURCES IS TOO HIGH TO PAY.
5. THE ADJUSTMENT PROCESS. GOF, DESPITE FACT IT NOW IS PARTICIPATING IN JOINT FLOAT, PREFERS SYSTEM WITH CONSIDERABLY LESS FLEXIBILITY THAN WE WOULD LIKE TO SEE. FOR FRANCE, PARITIES SHOULD BE MORE ” STABLE” OR ” FIXED” THAN ” ADJUSTABLE”. POMPIDOU CAN BE EXPECTED TO EMPHASIZE IMPORTANCE OF CLASSIC TOOLS OF MONETARY AND FISCAL POLICY AS ALTERNATIVE TO FLOATING IN RESTORATION EXTERNAL EQUILIBRIUM. HE WILL ALSO BE SUSPICIOUS OF ANY USE OF AUTOMATIC ( AS OPPOSED TO INDICATIVE) INDICATORS TRIGGERING EXCHANGE RATE ADJUSTMENT. IN COUNTERING SUCH ARGUMENTS, WE COULD POINT TO A) INSTABILITY INTRODUCED INTO BRETTON WOODS SYSTEM BY STICKINESS OF EXCHANGE RATES, AND B) DIFFICULTY FOR COUNTRIES OPERATING IN CURRENT ECONOMIC ENVIRONMENT TO GIVE EXTERNAL OBJECTIVES PRIORITY OVER DOMESTIC ONES.
6. TIMING OF NEGOTIATIONS. GOF HAS TAKEN PUBLIC POSITION THAT NEGOTIATIONS TOWARD REFORM ARE MOVING TOO SLOWLY, LARGELY BECAUSE SHORT- TERM CRISES CREATED BY PERSISTENT U. S. BALANCE OF PAYMENTS DIFICIT DIVERT ATTENTION OF GOVERNMENTS AWAY FROM LONG- TERM PROBLEMS. POMPIDOU WILL BE PESSIMISTIC ABOUT POSSIBILITY OF REACHING AGREEMENT, EVEN ON GENERAL PRINCIPLES, BY FALL OF 1973. ECHOING THEME SOUNDED BY FINANCE MINISTER GISCARD D’ ESTAING AT IMF MEETING LAST FALL, HE MAY SUGGEST CONCENTRATING FIRST ON ONE OR TWO SPECIFIC AREAS – E. G. EXCHANGE RATE MECH-
ANISMS AND MONETARY ARRANGEMENTS IN FAVOR DIVELOPING NATIONS.
THIS WOULD SIGNAL FRENCH TACTIC OF WEARING DOWN OTHER NEGOTIATORS TO ELICIT CONCESSIONS IN DIRECTION FRENCH VIEWPOINTS ON QUESTIONS SUCH AS ROLE OF GOLD WHERE FRENCH ARE VERY MUCH ISOLATED. HERE, WE COULD USEFULLY ELABORATE OUR CONCEPT THAT MONETARY REFORM CANNOT BE ACCOMPLISHED PIECEMEAL SINCE ALL ELEMENTS OF SYSTEM STRONGLY INTERACT.
7. UNLIKE SITUATION AT TIME AZORES MEETING, OUTSTANDING MONETARY ISSUES DO NOT SEEM RIPE FOR SETTLEMENT IN ICELAND. CONSEQUENTLY, WE BELIEVE BEST U. S. TACTIC WOULD BE AVOIDANCE DETAILED DISCUSSION OF TECHNICAL POINTS ON GROUNDS C-20 IS BEST PLACE TO RESOLVE THEM. OUR OBJECTIVE SHOULD RATHER BE A JOINT STATEMENT EXPRESSING URGENCY OF PROGRESS IN C-20 AND IMPORTANCE ACHIEVING SUBSTANTIAL AGREEMENT ON OUTLINE OF REFORM PLAN IN TIME FOR NAIROBI MEETING. IF WE WISHED TO OBTAIN FRENCH AGREEMENT AT THIS MEETING ON SUCH QUESTIONS AS FLEXIBILITY, THE ADJUSTMENT PROCESS, CAPITAL
CONTROLS, ETC., WE BELIEVE WE WOULD HAVE TO PAY A PRICE IN THE FORM OF CONCESSIONS ON CONVERTIBILITY AND THE ROLE OF GOLD WHICH WE ASSUME WE ARE NOT PREPARED TO PAY. IRWIN
CONFIDENTIAL
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